- Name:Jayden Stone
- Position:Combo Guard
- HT/WT:6-4/180
- Class:Graduate
- Hometown:Perth, Australia
- Previous School:West Virginia
Background
It’s a cliché to call Jayden Stone a hooping nomad.
It’s also accurate.
When the graduate student dons black and gold for Missouri, the Aussie’s travelogue will feature stops in the following communities since he was 15 years old:
- Birmingham, Alabama
- Anniston, Alabama
- Wichita, Kansas
- Phoenix, Arizona
- Detroit, Michigan
- Morgantown, West Virginia
- Columbia, Missouri
Almost a decade ago, Stone went to his mom and said he intended “to chase a dream.” Last fall, he told reporters in West Virginia that it meant “living independently” while in high school, which included stops at Central Park Christian, Sacred Heart Catholic, and Sunrise Christian Academy. As a junior, he led Sacred Heart to a runner-up finish in Alabama’s Class 2A, averaging 21.1 points and 10.2 rebounds to garner Player of the Year honors for that division.
Stone signed with Grand Canyon out of SCA but only saw sporadic action across two seasons for the Antelopes. How Stone came to the attention of Detroit Mercy is a missing element of his origin story. Coach Mike Davis is an Alabama native and spent six seasons at UAB. Perhaps a contact in his Rolodex tipped him off. Details might be lacking, but Stone fits the profile of player Davis tried to import to the Motor City: reserves from quality mid-majors looking for expanded roles.
We do know that when Stone arrived, he moved in with Antoine Davis, the coach’s son and the second-leading scorer in NCAA history. At various times, Davis said he intended for Stone to form a tandem with Antoine. That plan started well enough, too. Stone averaged 13.9 points and 5.3 boards over UDM’s first 13 games, and his output jumped to 17.8 points per game once the Titans began Horizon League play.
That momentum ran aground after four conference games.
While the semester wound down, Stone stopped attending classes and skipped midterms. In November 2023, he told The Detroit News the backsliding resulted from severe homesickness and a bout of depression. Despite a waiver request, the NCAA ruled him academically ineligible.
Stone set about winning back Davis’ trust between his junior and senior seasons. First, he spent two months back home in Australia with his family and renewing his faith. When he returned to Detroit, he packed on 15 pounds of muscle and took up residence in Calihan Hall. Stone went so far as to move back into a freshman dorm – negating any possible excuse for truancy.
To Davis, the sum of those actions served as sufficient atonement and merited Stone a second chance. Necessity also dictated it. His son, who piled up more than 3,600 points, was gone, part of an exodus that saw five starters and 88.1% of UDM’s scoring depart. Asked by a reporter if Stone apologized to his teammates, Davis said no.
“If he goes for 16 and above,” Davis said. “That’s a good apology.”
To that end, Stone made good, putting up 20.3 points per game to lead the Horizon in scoring. Not that it mattered. UDM’s supporting cast fell to tatters. Two transfers – forward Oton Jankovic and guard Donovann Toatley – quit the team. Alex Tchikou, a two-time transfer, wasn’t eligible until December 2023, when a federal court ruling made it possible to play. Except he was back in his native France and ran into passport problems. Oh, and three Titans – Stone, Ryan Hurst, and Emmanuel Kuac – missed varying amounts of time with lower body injuries.
“Shitstorm,” said Mike Davis Jr., an assistant on his father’s staff, when asked to sum up the moribund campaign.
The Titans started 0-26, notching their only win over IUPUI in mid-February. Unsurprisingly, a 1-31 record prompted UDM to move on from Davis, and Stone didn’t stick around for a reboot under Mark Montgomery.
He committed to West Virginia in early June 2024, and then-coach Darian DeVries touted Stone’s versatility as his best asset. DeVries’ first roster was undersized, but it would feature ample scoring punch in the backcourt with Stone, Javon Small and Tucker DeVries.
During the preseason, Stone told Morgantown scribes that the losing at UDM was “like a weight.” He was also acutely aware that his role and usage made him “a scapegoat behind everything that’s happening or not happening” inside a program. One of the draws to West Virginia was that DeVries said he wasn’t a carpenter looking to do a meticulous rebuild. The intention was to win – fast.
Yet Stone wouldn’t be involved at all. He missed the entire campaign with an undisclosed injury.
What can Stone hang his hat on offensively?
Explaining Stone’s sky-high usage isn’t a matter of great complexity. As you just read, UDM’s rotation was ransacked by misfortune, leaving Davis with only two reliable cast members in Stone and Marcus Tankersley.
So, why focus on the fact he soaked up 30.5 percent of possessions? Because it’s an ample trove that MU’s staff can pick and choose what needs to stay or go. It’s also a diverse batch of touches. Unlike many high-usage peers, Stone wasn’t reliant on a never-ending supply of pick-and-rolls.
A review of his play-type data reveals he routinely flexed off the ball to spot up. Stone is also versed in coming off an array of screening actions. And in a pinch, he’s fine going solo in ISO situations, often at the end of the shot clock when the Titans exhausted their options. Unfortunately, his most common actions weren’t all that efficient.
In Stone’s defense, he and Tankersley were obvious focal points atop scouting reports. They were going to draw top defenders, and forget spreading the workload around. There were some games where UDM dressed only eight players. And because of UDM’s profile, it’s often banking on imports scaling up their workloads for the first time.
Like DeVries a year ago, it’s easy to imagine MU coach Dennis Gates buying into Stone’s versatility and assuming poor touches would fall away with a better supporting cast.
Case in point: Stone’s performance in PNRs. His 0.806 points per possession ranked in the 56th percentile nationally, per Synergy Sports data, on a volume close to the Division-I median. That included 1.0 PPP on dribble 3s taken out of high PNRs. Often, those emerged from simple five-out alignments or using weave action as a trigger before a big man set a step-up screen.
On tape, Stone’s a smooth operator. His pick-ups are clean and transition in a smooth upward motion that remains fluid and compact. When crowded, Stone uses a hesitation dribble into a jab step to create enough air space to get his shot away.
Two seasons ago, he also showed a knack for hunting the mid-range when he put a defender in a trail position. As we’ve said before, there’s value in having guards capable of exploiting spaces an opponent is willing to concede, and Stone’s volume of long 2s (eight attempts) out of high ball screens wasn’t exorbitant.
Yet, it’s also easy to envision MU demanding some prudence. At times, Stone might push a drive one dribble too deep and find himself settling for shorter but contested pull-ups.
Similarly, Stone would sometimes be a bit too committed on drives from ball screens. Those failed rim attacks often resulted from instances where his defender recovered or a switch forced a reset. Usually, Stone relied on a modest hesitation dribble or feathered the throttle because he lacked an elite first step to create separation.
There’s a temptation to label Stone stubborn, but watch what the screener does in most of those clips. They simply get out of the way. In 2023-24, UDM ranked 347th in Division I for average height, and that tiny roster lacked bigs capable of applying rim pressure. That season, the Titans finished 259th nationally for the percentage possession that resulted in a roll to the rim or a big man popping.
That won’t be the case in Columbia.
Shawn Phillips Jr., who arrives from Arizona State, yearns to roll down the middle of the lane for lobs. By contrast, Trent Burns is keen to pick and pop. And assuming jumbo spacers like Jacob Crews, Trent Pierce and Jevon Porter find a measure of consistency from long-range, there’s a potential surcharge for any defender who stunts too aggressively into a gap. So, optimists would note – not unreasonably – that some of Stone’s forced rim attacks might be converted to productive passes.
What gives me some pause about that strain of thought is that Stone coughed the ball up 19.4 percent of the time in high PNRs. Moreover, his assist-to-turnover in the half-court was just 0.87, per Synergy’s data, and his passes from all ball screens were worth just 0.718 PPP.
Here’s the likelier scenario: a more talented and well-rounded roster means more space to exploit on some drives. And that potential firepower makes it easier for Stone to move the ball along, even if it doesn’t net him an assist in the scorer’s book. But the flashes he occasionally shows shooting off the bounce would balance out a ball-handling contingent heavy on straight-line drivers.
Now we come to the most pointed critique of this pickup: Stone’s shooting.
Yes, he shot 51.9 percent from 3-point range in 13 games as a junior. But I put far more stock in the one complete season Stone put on his CV. As a senior, he knocked 33 of 106 catch-and-shoot attempts from beyond the arc against a set defense, and his clip plummeted to 19.6 percent with a hand in his face.
However, Stone produced markedly better results when left alone. So, I queued up those clips to see what conditions produced steady makes. It turns out he tallied many of them against zone looks or when a defense was in scramble mode after an offensive rebound.
Rummaging around Stone’s data revealed a pocket of quality shooting off movement when it came off screens working right to the left. Usually, those entailed UDM putting him in zipper action or using floppy action to sprint from a block to the wing – tactics MU used to trigger some of its half-court sets when Caleb Grill was on the floor.
But outside of those possessions, Stone was just 5 of 24 from the floor when using a screen to shake loose.
It’s hard to know whether Stone only presents the illusion of versatility. He dabbles in various styles and actions, but after spending time with his data and film, it’s hard to pin down what he does well precisely. That’s not a problem we had with other Horizon imports like DeAndre Gholston and Marques Warrick.
Take Warrick, for instance. It was easy to see he thrived when using slot ball screens on the right side of the floor to attack with his left hand, and he spent most of his career as a capable spot-up threat. Once he arrived in Columbia, the staff culled inefficient runners and floaters that Warrick might force up when confronted by size during a paint touch.
As for Dree, the staff sought ways to isolate him around the elbow and nail against mismatches, creating more effective mid-range opportunities. He was also proficient enough (36.7%) when left alone to spot up from deep.
Ultimately, Stone leaves me vexed because I’m unsure what niche he fills. He doesn’t carve defenses up in ball screens. He’s not a true facilitator. And any hints of shooting we see, either stationary or off movement, are sporadic.
Is his presence a potential hindrance? Assuming developmental plans unfold as expected and injuries don’t beset MU, the likely answer is no. More than likely, Stone settles in as a deep-bench option who occasionally offers some scoring pop.
Can Stone become an adequate defender?
In a moment, we will look at some gnarly play-type data, which doesn’t paint a flattering portrait of Stone as a defender. I’m less interested in those rows and columns than the broader question of whether the vet is simply a product of his environment.
Let’s start broadly. Since the 2019-20 campaign, when Gates arrived at Cleveland State, the Horizon League has never ranked lower than 11th in offensive efficiency, including three top-five finishes. Over that same period, the conference routinely landed in the lower third for block and steal rates. And often, just two or three of its members whose adjusted defensive efficiencies rank ahead of the D1 median.
So, if you’re a program in the market for defensive reinforcements, the Horizon is probably the wrong place to search.
But even among leaky peers, UDM’s performance stands out. In six seasons at the helm, Davis never fielded a team that finished better than 299th in adjusted efficiency. Per Synergy’s data, the Titans were among the worst programs nationally when playing man-to-man defense during Stone’s time there.
Maybe the handiwork you see below is a true and accurate reflection of Stone’s ability to guard. But defensive metrics are notoriously squishy. We must account for the quality of the opponent, schematic preferences, talent, and scouting reports. Based on the reams of stats I just threw at you, it’s fair to say Stone spent a couple of years in a habit unlikely to produce a lockdown defender.
That context is helpful when noting that Stone finished in the ninth percentile nationally for defending catch-and-shoot jumpers.
Because his roster was perpetually undermanned and small, Davis occasionally trotted out a variety of zone looks, including 1-3-1, amoeba 2-3, and trapping 2-2-1 setups. It’s well known that those tactics entail a willingness to concede spot-ups in favor of sealing up gaps. Even buttoned-up outfits are susceptible to it. Well, UDM allowed almost 1.3 points per possession when zoning up – far from the intended effect Davis had in mind.
For Stone, those zone possessions left a dark stain on his profile because Davis deployed him at the top of the 1-3-1 or asked him to work in a tandem at the front of the 2-3. On film, it’s easy to spot woeful communication and synchronization that often created two-v-one situations or left Stone in scramble mode.
That batch of snippets also includes instances where Stone lagged in recovering when stunting into a gap or after rotating toward the mid-line. But I get fixated on the zone possessions because MU has shown a penchant for using similar looks to disrupt an opponent’s rhythm and flow.
Admittedly, Stone’s performance when contesting shots (1.5 PPP) was equally putrid, and on tape, a handful of those attempts barely clear the bar for being classified as guarded. However, there are some snippets – often showing Stone recovering from digs or sinking toward the baseline – where Stone does laudable work getting a hand in the face of a shooter. His metrics would be passable if three of those shots don’t drop.
But again, how ingrained are some of these habits?
Over Gates’ three seasons at MU, the Tigers routinely over-rotated to drivers, creating long closeouts. They struggled at times with keeping tabs on shooters relocating. And automatic switching sometimes created mismatches where a big man had to rely on a smaller guard scrambling to nix an open jumper.
What’s jarring in some of these clips is the lack of fight. Even if a screener does a sloppy job, leaving room for Stone to easily avoid contact, he still gets dusted. He’s rarely in a stance or trying to stay attached.
And when a dribbler rejected a ball screen, Stone was happy to pawn the work off on slower-footed bigs in a switch.
On film, Stone looks like a combo guard we might find in the SEC. Maybe he has the athletic tools to become a competent defensive presence. Unfortunately, the data and tape render that notion totally theoretical.
The limitations might be easier to overlook if there were abundant evidence that he had an offensive toolkit capable of offsetting any buckets he gives up. The transitional style of play under Gates asks defenders to be more assertive, but it also leaves some Tigers out of position. We saw some signs last season that a longer and more athletic roster created more reliability – until the campaign’s final four weeks.
What’s the upside here?
For one, Stone has shown a knack for rebounding well at his position, grabbing 12.3 percent of defensive boards when on the floor. He also posted a 2.5 steal percentage for UDM and created those takeaways without running up a massive foul count (1.023 PFx) along the way. When Stone had the opportunity to play in transition, he produced his most efficient (1.195 PPP) scoring touches.
There’s also the matter of exposure. Ideally, Barrett continues to improve and evolve into a reliable understudy for Mack, supplying Gates with a pair of physical on-ball stoppers to soak up most minutes at combo guard. And if the staff pays close attention to lineup configurations, some combinations might mitigate Stone’s weaknesses.